This study provides a theoretical framework and experimental evidence on how managers' disclosure decisions affect their credibility with investors. Further, I examine whether investors' judgments of management credibility are based on different factors in the short-and longer-term. My results show that in the short-term, management disclosure decisions regarding negative news have larger effects on perceived management credibility than disclosure decisions regarding positive news. Specifically, managers who warn investors about unexpected negative news are rewarded with greater credibility increases than managers who warn about unexpected positive news, and managers who fail to warn about unexpected negative news are penalized with greater credibility decreases than managers who fail to warn about unexpected positive news. The results also show that these short-term credibility effects do not persist over time. In the longer-term, managers who report positive earnings news are rated as having higher credibility than managers who report negative earnings news, regardless of their disclosure decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Firms that are able to credibly communicate information have less disperse and more accurate analyst forecasts, lower bid-ask spreads, and consequently, a lower cost of capital than less credible firms (Botosan 1997; Barron et al. 1999; Healy et al. 1999) . Recent popular press articles have detailed how Xerox managers suffered "another blow to their credibility" (Maremont 2002) , how Dupont's management has made progress in its "battle to regain credibility with Wall Street" (Warren 2001) , and Guess Inc.'s efforts to "repair its badly damaged credibility with investors" (Bannon 2001) . In fact, Dennis Koslowski, CEO of Tyco, recently noted that a CEO's job "is all about credibility" (Lublin 2001) . Despite the likely importance of credibility to managers, we have a limited understanding of the factors affecting management credibility. The extant literature has examined the consequences of having (or not having) credibility; however, there has been little systematic study regarding how specific disclosure decisions influence or determine credibility. Identifying determinants of management credibility is the focus of this study.
I offer a theoretical framework and experimental evidence regarding how management's disclosure decisions affect management credibility, where management credibility is defined as investors' beliefs about management's competence and trustworthiness in financial disclosure.
Based on attribution theory and affect-based reasoning theories, I predict that the management credibility consequences of a disclosure decision will depend on news valence (i.e., whether news is positive or negative). In addition, I predict that management credibility is based on different factors in the short-term and long-term.
To test these predictions, I conduct an experiment in which I vary (1) whether management provides a warning about unexpected earnings, (2) whether unexpected earnings convey positive or negative news relative to the consensus analyst forecast, and (3) the time elapsing between the earnings announcement and participants' assessments of management's credibility. My experimental approach complements the existing empirical-archival work on reactions to disclosure decisions in several important ways. Using an experimental approach allows me to hold constant factors other than management disclosures; such control is especially helpful when studying the determinants of credibility because firms with high credibility are fundamentally different in terms of earnings and returns than firms with lesser credibility (Lang and Lundholm 1993) . Experimentation also allows for the collection of data on investor reactions to specific disclosure decisions. Archival research typically has used financial analysts' ratings of a firm's disclosures (AIMR reports) to measure a firm's credibility.
However, AIMR reports are annual ratings, and the long time lag between a particular management disclosure and the subsequent AIMR report makes it difficult to use these reports to infer the credibility effects of a specific disclosure decision.
The experimental results are generally consistent with my predictions. I find that in the short-term, management disclosure decisions regarding negative news have larger effects on perceived management credibility than disclosure decisions regarding positive news.
Specifically, managers who warn investors about unexpected negative news increase their credibility with investors more than managers who warn about unexpected positive news; managers who fail to warn about unexpected negative news lose more credibility than managers who fail to warn about unexpected positive news. Further, these short-term credibility effects do not persist over time. In the longer-term, perceived management credibility is primarily a function of whether the firm reports positive or negative news. That is, managers of firms with positive earnings news are rated as being more trustworthy and competent in financial disclosure than managers of firms with negative earnings news, regardless of their previous disclosure decisions.
These results should be informative to firm managers who struggle to foresee investors' reactions to their disclosure decisions. The theoretical literature on disclosure assumes that managers properly weigh the costs and benefits of various disclosures when making disclosure decisions (Dye 1985) . However, managers cannot properly weigh these costs and benefits if they do not correctly anticipate investor reactions to their disclosure decisions, and firm managers often appear surprised by investors' reactions to their disclosures (McKay 2000) . My study's results suggest that firms seeking immediate improvements to their credibility should concentrate on their negative news disclosures, as these disclosures have the greatest effects on short-term management credibility. In contrast, managers interested in longer-term credibility should focus on performance rather than disclosure, as the credibility effects of voluntary disclosure decisions are not long-lived.
The results also have implications for researchers who study voluntary disclosures.
Several studies have operationalized the informativeness of a firm's disclosure policy as the overall amount of disclosure (e.g., Botosan 1997) . This measure may be a rough proxy because my results indicate that investors do not value all voluntary disclosures equally. Incorporating information about whether the disclosure conveys positive or negative news should result in more refined measures. In addition, my results may have implications for archival researchers who use AIMR reports to measure the actual quality of voluntary disclosure. AIMR reports capture analysts' perceptions of disclosure quality rather than actual disclosure quality. To the extent that AIMR ratings are made via a process similar to that used to evaluate longer-term credibility, my data suggest these ratings may not be a good proxy for actual disclosure quality.
Rather, AIMR ratings are likely to be based largely on firm performance. Lang and Lundholm (1993) provide some support for this idea, as they find that firms with higher AIMR ratings have higher earnings and stock returns. They argue that these results may be due to firms' tendencies to provide more complete disclosures when they are doing well. In other words, Lang and Lundholm suggest that firm performance affects a firm's actual disclosures which, in turn, affect analysts' perceptions. My results suggest a simpler explanation. AIMR ratings could be a direct result of prior firm performance, independent of any actual disclosure differences across firms.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Credibility Consequences of Disclosure Decisions
Firm managers face numerous decisions in the process of crafting voluntary disclosures.
They can choose whether to disclose, when to disclose, how much to disclose, and the degree of disclosure accuracy. In many cases, the quality of a firm's voluntary disclosures can be evaluated, either at the time of the disclosure or when the firm's actual financial results are revealed. Hence, it is likely that management's voluntary disclosure decisions will influence management credibility.
1 Several studies suggest that whether and when management makes disclosures (hereafter termed timeliness), how much management chooses to disclose (hereafter termed completeness), and whether management is accurate in their disclosures (hereafter termed accuracy) affect its credibility with investors. Libby and Tan (1999) demonstrate that managers who provide timely warnings about unexpected negative earnings are rated as having higher credibility than managers who do not provide such disclosures. No studies directly examine the management credibility consequences of more complete disclosure; however, more complete disclosures are associated with positive stock price effects (Botosan 1997) . These results are consistent with a causal argument in which more complete disclosure leads to higher management credibility, which leads to a lower cost of capital (King et al. 1990 ). There is direct evidence that disclosure accuracy affects management credibility. Tan et al. (1999) show that managers who accurately forecast earnings have higher perceived competence and trustworthiness than managers who significantly overstate or understate earnings. Also, firms with a reputation for accurate reporting are more likely to influence analysts and investors in their subsequent disclosures (Williams 1996) .
My study focuses on the timeliness of managers' voluntary disclosures. 2 Specifically, I
examine the credibility consequences of managers' decisions about whether to provide investors with warnings about unexpected earnings. 3 Research in psychology proposes that more timely disclosure will lead to higher perceived credibility (Giffin 1967; Mayer et al. 1995) , and Libby and Tan's (1999) results provide support for this proposition in a voluntary disclosure setting.
Thus, prior research suggests that managers who provide warnings about unexpected earnings will be perceived as more credible than managers who do not provide such disclosures.
Effects of News Valence on the Credibility Consequences of Disclosure Decisions
Overview
This section takes the basic proposition that more timely disclosure will increase management credibility a step further. Drawing on attribution theory and affect-based reasoning theories, I hypothesize that all warnings about unexpected earnings are not equal in their effects on management credibility and that these credibility effects differ in the short-versus longerterm. Figure 1 provides an overview of my model. My basic proposition is that cognitive responses to news valence (i.e., whether earnings news is positive or negative) and disclosure decisions (i.e., whether management provides a warning) will jointly determine management credibility effects in the short-term. As time passes, however, affective responses to new valence and disclosure decisions will determine management credibility. These short-and longer-term reactions are described in more detail below.
[Insert Figure 1 ]
Short-term Credibility Consequences
The term 'attribution theory' refers to a group of theories from social psychology that explain how individuals determine why an event has occurred (Fiske and Taylor 1991) . I draw on attribution theory to explain why the short-term credibility consequences of management's disclosure decisions depend on whether the earnings news is positive or negative. Specifically, I
predict that news valence will influence both the amount and type of attributions made by investors, and that these attributions, in turn, affect perceived management credibility.
The attribution literature shows that people are more likely to think about why an event has occurred when that event is negative (Weiner 1985) . Because negative outcomes are more likely to trigger attributional processing than positive outcomes, I anticipate that investors will spend more time thinking about negative news disclosure decisions. The attribution literature also suggests that investors will make different types of attributions regarding negative news voluntary disclosures and positive news voluntary disclosures. 4 Specifically, a disclosure that is at odds with the manager's personal incentives is more likely to be attributed to some enduring dispositional characteristic of the manager (i.e., their honesty or trustworthiness) than a disclosure that is consistent with the manager's incentives (Jones and Davis 1965) . Because negative news tends to have an unfavorable impact on managers' tenure and compensation (Dimma 1996; Hughes 1997 ), investors will likely view warnings about negative news as more inconsistent with managers' personal incentives than warnings about positive news. Thus, I
expect that investors receiving negative news warnings are more likely to attribute those warnings to management's honesty and trustworthiness than investors receiving positive news warnings.
These differences in attributions, in turn, are predicted to affect perceived credibility.
Because investors spend more time thinking about the reasons for negative news disclosure decisions and negative new disclosures are more likely to result in dispositional attributions, warnings about negative news are expected to result in larger increases in management credibility than warnings about positive news. Similarly, a failure to warn about negative news is predicted to result in a larger decrease in perceived management credibility than a failure to warn about positive news. This reasoning is summarized in Hypothesis 1 and can be seen 
H1:
In the short-term, providing warnings about negative news will lead to greater increases in management credibility than providing warnings about positive news. Not warning about negative news will lead to greater decreases in management credibility than not warning about positive news.
[Insert Figure 2 ]
Longer-term Credibility Consequences
I also propose that the short-term credibility consequences predicted in Hypothesis 1 may not hold over time. As time passes subsequent to a disclosure decision, investors' memories of the detailed information underlying their credibility assessments will fade. When investors try to recall these details, they will reconstruct prior events to be consistent with their overall affective reaction to the events (Clore et al. 1994; Kida and Smith 1995) .
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To explain the longer-term credibility consequences of disclosure decisions, I draw on an affect-based model of financial decision-making proposed by Kida and Smith (1995) . Kida and Smith argue that when investors experience an event, both the event and the overall affective reaction to that event are encoded in memory. Further, they posit that affective reactions create stronger memory traces than the specific events underlying those reactions, so as time passes, the specific details about the event become less accessible in memory than the overall affective reaction (Damasio 1994) . As a result, when people try to remember the event, their memories are reconstructed to be consistent with that overall affective reaction. If Kida and Smith are correct about the role that affect plays in memory, investors' overall affective reactions should influence their memories of management's disclosure decisions and, consequently, their longerterm assessments of management's credibility.
Although affect-based reasoning theories predict that the longer-term credibility consequences of a disclosure decision will be determined by investors' overall affective reactions, they do not specify whether an investor's overall affective reaction will be determined by news valence or management's disclosure decision. Investors are hypothesized to experience affective reactions to both the earnings news and the disclosure decision. In some cases, these affective reactions will be in conflict, such as when managers report negative news (which results in negative affect) but provide a warning about the news (which results in positive affect). Kida and Smith (1995) argue that in cases where underlying components of an event promote conflicting affective responses, the stronger of the affective reactions will determine investors' overall affective reaction. However, this research does not provide an unambiguous prediction about which reaction -news valence or disclosure decision -will be stronger. I therefore discuss longer-term credibility effects under both scenarios.
Some evidence suggests that investors' affective reactions to earnings news will be stronger than their affective reactions to the related disclosure decisions. Unexpected earnings news appears to have a greater impact on stock market reactions than the associated disclosure decisions (Kasznik and Lev 1995) . To the extent that investors ultimately care most about their stock market returns, reactions to the earnings news will be stronger than reactions to the related disclosure decision. As shown in Panel B of Figure 2 , if investors experience stronger affective reactions to earnings news, the long-term credibility consequences of disclosure decisions will be determined primarily by news valence. That is, managers of firms with negative earnings news will be rated as having lower credibility than managers of firms with positive earnings news, regardless of whether investors were warned about the news.
Alternatively, overall affective reactions may be determined primarily by disclosure decisions rather than news valence. Koehler and Gershoff (2002) show that when people believe that they have been betrayed, they experience stronger affective reactions than justified by their actual loss. Therefore, investors' affective reactions to disclosure decisions may be stronger than their reactions to the earnings news if they feel betrayed by managers' nondisclosures. If affective reactions to the disclosure decision are stronger, disclosure decisions will be the primary determinant of investors' longer-term credibility judgments. As a result, managers who provide warnings about unexpected news will be perceived as more credible than managers who do not provide warnings, regardless of whether those disclosures relate to positive earnings news or negative earnings news.
To summarize, I expect that as time passes, investors' memories of the detailed information underlying their beliefs about management credibility will fade. When investors attempt to recall these details, they will reconstruct events to be consistent with their initial overall affective reaction to the events. As a result, I predict that in the longer-term, investors' perception of management credibility will be determined by their overall affective reaction to the news valence and disclosure decision. However, because the affect-based reasoning literature does not specify whether investors' overall affective reactions will be determined primarily by news valence or disclosure decisions, I do not make predictions about the primary determinant of those reactions.
H2:
As time passes subsequent to management's disclosure decisions, investors' overall affective reactions will determine their perceptions of management's credibility.
III. EXPERIMENT Participants
To test my hypotheses, I conducted an experiment with 244 MBA students at a large state university. Participants were recruited via an email notice sent to all MBA students and were paid a flat wage of $10 plus the chance to win a random lottery. On average, study participants had six years of work experience and had completed three accounting and two finance classes; nearly all (94%) had invested in common stocks or common stock mutual funds.
Experimental Design and Task
The experiment is based on a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with Disclosure Decision (Warning, No Warning), News Valence (Positive News, Negative News), and Time
Elapsed since the disclosure decision (Short-term, Longer-term) as independent variables.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the experimental procedures. Participants were asked to assume the role of a member of an investment club that had recently purchased the common stock of Dentex, a company in the dental supply industry. Each participant was given background information about the company, including brief excerpts from management's discussion and analysis and historical financial statement data. Participants also were informed that the consensus analyst forecast for the company's upcoming quarterly earnings was $0.52.
After reviewing this information, participants provided pre-test assessments of management credibility.
[Insert Figure 3 Subsequently, all participants answered a number of demographic questions regarding their investing experience, work experience, and prior coursework. All participants then were provided with the firm's actual quarterly earnings. Actual earnings were reported as $0.60 to participants in the Positive News condition and $0.44 to participants in the Negative News condition. Thus, I manipulated whether investors were warned (i.e., disclosure timeliness) and held constant the accuracy and completeness of disclosure. After viewing the actual earnings information, all participants answered several manipulation check and affective reaction questions.
Participants in the Short-term condition answered additional questions immediately after viewing the actual earnings information. Specifically, they provided assessments of management's credibility, answered questions about their attributional processing, and indicated the degree to which they would be willing to rely on a subsequent forecast issued by management. Longer-term participants answered this same set of questions approximately two weeks after completing the experimental materials.
7
Credibility Measures
The primary dimensions of management credibility are management competence and management trustworthiness. To capture these dimensions, I combined questions from two widely accepted source credibility scales: McCroskey (1966) and Leathers (1992) . The
Appendix shows the six questions that were chosen from these scales. Three competence questions focus on investors' perceptions of the competence, knowledge, and qualifications of management for providing financial disclosures. Three trustworthiness questions focus on investors' perceptions of management's trustworthiness, honesty, and truthfulness.
As noted previously, archival accounting research has demonstrated the important consequences of management credibility. Because my paper focuses on the determinants of credibility, my primary dependent variable is perceived management credibility. That is, I focus on how management's disclosure decisions affect investors' perceptions of management credibility, rather than on how differences in credibility judgments affect earnings predictions or investment decisions.
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However, to ensure that participants' credibility ratings have behavioral consequences, I
also examine whether differences in perceived credibility are reflected in subsequent behavior.
Managers care about their credibility because investors are more likely to rely on disclosures from highly credible managers (and greater reliance on management disclosures results in a reduction in information asymmetry and its associated costs) (King et al. 1990 ). Therefore, in addition to testing the effects of disclosure decisions on perceived management credibility, I
examine the effects of these decisions on participants' willingness to rely on subsequent management disclosures. Specifically, after participants viewed the experimental manipulations, they were shown a management earnings forecast for a subsequent quarter and asked how willing they would be to rely on this forecast when predicting earnings.
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IV. RESULTS
Manipulation and Other Checks
Responses to the manipulation check questions indicated that all manipulations were successful. In the Warning condition, 98% of participants correctly indicated that they received To rule out the possibility that I not only manipulated news valence (positive or negative)
but also the expectedness of the news, participants were asked to evaluate the expectedness of the earnings information. A possible alternative explanation for my hypothesized results is that participants were more surprised by the negative earnings news than the positive earnings news.
However, the results reveal that participants in the Negative News condition were not significantly more surprised by the unexpected earnings than participants in the Positive News condition (t=0.47, p=0.64), thereby ruling out this explanation.
Credibility Differences in the Short-and Longer-term
Participants' responses to the credibility questions indicated that the three competence questions and the three trustworthiness questions each captured a separate underlying construct, 
Short-term Effects
Hypothesis 1 predicts that in the short-term, providing warnings about negative news will lead to greater credibility gains than providing warnings about positive news, and not providing warnings about negative news will lead to greater credibility losses than not providing warnings about positive news. Follow-up analyses confirm that participants are more willing to rely on a subsequent disclosure when managers had previously warned about negative news (µ=5.48) than when managers had warned about positive news (µ=5.01) (F=3.21, p=0.08). In addition, participants are less likely to rely on a subsequent disclosure when management failed to warn about negative news (µ=3.57) than when management failed to warn about positive news (µ=5.05) (F=24.50, p<0.01).
Thus, negative news disclosure decisions have greater effects on subsequent reliance than positive news disclosure decisions, suggesting that management credibility affects investors' willingness to rely on management disclosures.
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Longer-term Effects
Hypothesis 2 predicts that investors' longer-term credibility assessments will be determined by their affective, rather than cognitive, reactions. Immediately after experiencing the experimental manipulations, participants provided assessments of their affect related to the disclosure decision and the news valence. These assessments were made on comparable 7-point Likert-type scales. I calculated the strength of affect related to the disclosure decision as the absolute value of the difference between the participant's affective response and the scale midpoint; the strength of affect related to the earnings news was calculated in the same manner.
I then calculated the relative strength of participants' affective responses by subtracting disclosure decision affect strength from earnings news affect strength. If affective reactions to news valence are stronger than affective reactions to disclosure decisions, the mean of this relative affect measure will be positive. On the other hand, if affective reactions to disclosure decisions are stronger, the mean of the relative affect measure will be negative. I find that mean relative affect is positive and significantly different than zero (t=2.32, p=0.02), suggesting that affective responses to news valence are stronger than affective responses to disclosure decisions.
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Because the above data suggest that investors experience stronger affective responses to news valence than to disclosure decisions, I expect news valence to be the primary determinant of management credibility in the longer-term. In statistical terms, this suggests that two-way
ANCOVAs for competence and trustworthiness will show only a significant main effect for News Valence. As seen in Figure B provides a summary of these results. The results suggest that there is little longer-term credibility benefit from providing warnings about unexpected earnings. Rather, in the longerterm, perceived management credibility is mainly a function of firm performance, with managers of firms that report positive earnings news being rated as having higher credibility than managers of firms that report negative earnings news.
[Insert Table 2] Based on the management credibility results, I expect that in the longer-term, news valence also will determine reliance on a subsequent disclosure. Consistent with this prediction, an ANOVA with reliance on a subsequent forecast as the dependent variable and News Valence and Disclosure Decision as independent variables shows a significant main effect for News Valence (F=3.81, p<0.05) and an insignificant main effect for Disclosure Decision (F=0.03, p=0.87). In the longer-term, Positive News participants are more willing to rely on a subsequent management disclosure than Negative News participants, and management's prior disclosure decision does not affect subsequent reliance.
14 To summarize, my results indicate that the short-term credibility benefits of providing warnings about unexpected earnings do not necessarily persist in the longer-term. I find that longer-term perceptions of management's competence and trustworthiness are driven primarily by news valence. Specifically, managers of firms with negative earnings news are rated as having lower credibility, and managers of firms with positive earnings news are rated as having higher credibility, regardless of whether investors were warned about unexpected news. In addition, these differences in perceived management credibility manifest themselves in reliance on subsequent disclosures.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Firm managers are continually faced with decisions about the extent to which they should voluntarily disclose unexpected news to analysts and investors. However, the extant literature provides little guidance about the factors that affect investors' reactions to managers' voluntary disclosure decisions. My study provides evidence on the short-and longer-term credibility consequences of managers' decisions to warn investors about unexpected earnings.
My results suggest that managers seeking immediate improvements to their credibility should concentrate on their negative news disclosures. Specifically, I find that disclosure decisions regarding negative news have larger short-term effects on management credibility than do positive news disclosure decisions. That is, managers who provide warnings about unexpected negative news receive larger boosts in perceived credibility than managers who provide warnings about unexpected positive news. Managers who fail to warn about negative news suffer larger decreases in perceived credibility than managers who fail to warn about unexpected positive news. These differences in perceived management credibility have important consequences, as I find that credibility influences investors' reliance on subsequent management disclosures.
My results also show that the credibility effects described above do not persist in the longer-term. Rather, management credibility is primarily a function of the valence of news disclosed. In the longer-term, managers of firms with positive earnings news are rated as having higher credibility than managers of firms with negative earnings news, regardless of managers' disclosure decisions. This result is interesting because of the uncertainty regarding whether managers are better off providing warnings about unexpected negative news. Kasznik and Lev (1995) and Libby and Tan (1999) find that firms who provide warnings are penalized with larger immediate stock price reactions than firms that do not provide such warnings. Despite this apparent penalty for warning about negative news, firms are still more likely to provide warnings about unexpected negative (versus positive) news (Skinner 1994) . Why might firms continue to warn investors about negative news despite the negative stock price consequences? One proposed explanation is that the immediate valuation benefits associated with failing to warn investors about negative news are overwhelmed by the longer-term credibility costs of not warning (Kasznik and Lev 1995) . Although negative news disclosure decisions have significant effects on managers' credibility in the short-term, I show that these credibility benefits for warning about negative news do not persist in the longer-term. Thus, my study provides evidence that long-term credibility concerns likely do not explain managers' greater willingness to warn about negative news. (Ross and Lepper 1980; Koehler 1993 ). For example, investors who strongly believe that management is credible may interpret a lack of disclosure differently than investors who believe management is not credible. Future research can examine how strong prior beliefs about management influence the credibility consequences of disclosure decisions.
ENDNOTES
1 As noted previously, management credibility is defined as investors' beliefs about management's competence and trustworthiness in providing financial disclosures (Hovland et al. 1953, 21; Giffin 1967) . 2 In practice, the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of voluntary disclosures may not be independent. For example, more timely management disclosures may be less accurate, because these disclosures are released significantly before the release of actual financial results. However, given my experimental design, I am able to manipulate timeliness and hold constant accuracy and completeness. 3 I choose to examine managers' disclosure decisions in this context for several reasons. First, there appears to be substantial real-world variation in managers' decisions to provide earnings warnings. For example, Skinner (1994) finds that firms provide warnings about large unexpected negative earnings news 25% of the time and warnings about large unexpected positive earnings news 7% of the time. In addition, prior studies on investors' reactions to earnings warnings (e.g., Kasznik and Lev 1995) are central to the development of my hypotheses regarding the longer-term credibility effects of disclosure decisions. 4 Attribution theory provides guidance on the types of attributions made subsequent to negative news disclosures and positive news disclosures, but does not specify the types of attributions that will be made in non-disclosure situations. Hence, I do not make predictions about the types of attributions made when warnings are not provided. 5 My predictions regarding the credibility effects of disclosure decisions do not differ for the two dimensions of management credibility -competence and trustworthiness. In my experiment, as in many real-world situations, participants do not know whether management fails to warn because management was mistaken about the firm's prospects (which should affect perceived competence) or because they were intentionally trying to mislead (which should affect perceived trustworthiness). Arguably, this uncertainty will cause management's warning decisions to affect both competence and trustworthiness. In further support of this view, prior research finds that attributes such as competence and trustworthiness tend to move together (Nathan and Tippins 1990) . That is, managers who are perceived as having one positive [negative] attribute are more likely to be perceived as having other positive [negative] attributes. 6 Historically, the term "affect" has been used to refer to various constructs, including evaluations, moods, and emotions. Evaluations refer to simple positive or negative feelings associated with a stimulus, and moods refer to general affective states (typically positive or negative) that are not targeted at a particular stimulus. Emotions refer to more fleeting affective states such as anger, jealousy, or serenity, that go beyond simple positive or negative feelings (Fiske and Taylor 1991) . Consistent with numerous recent articles that examine the role of affect on decision-making processes (e.g., Finucane et al. 2000) , I focus on affect as an evaluation. Thus, in this study, affect refers to a positive or negative emotional response associated with an event. 7 Pilot testing confirmed that two weeks was an appropriate time delay for this study. Two weeks was a sufficient amount of time for reconstruction to be necessary, but not so long that participant response rate was threatened. 8 Asking participants to provide earnings predictions or make investment decisions in addition to the credibility judgments could contaminate those credibility judgments. For example, study participants might have made investment decisions based on their personal investment philosophy, and then justified those decisions via their assessments of credibility (e.g., decisions to sell could be justified with low credibility judgments). Given the paucity of research on the determinants of credibility, I felt it was most important to accurately measure investors' credibility judgments. 9 A positive news management earnings forecast was chosen for this task because prior research shows that management credibility is most important for increasing the believability of subsequent positive news disclosures (Williams 1996) . 10 Results for the individual competence and trustworthiness questions are similar to those reported for the composite measures. 11 ANCOVA results are presented for simplicity. Inferences do not change when the data are analyzed using multivariate tests. In addition, results are presented using participants' pre-test credibility assessments as covariates, but analyses using difference scores lead to similar conclusions. 12 In addition to documenting the credibility effects associated with managers' disclosure decisions, my analyses provide insights into why these effects occur. Recall that news valence was expected to affect the amount and type of attributions resulting from management's disclosure decisions. I measured the amount of attributional processing by videotaping a subset of participants and recording the time they spent completing the materials. I find that participants in the Negative News condition spent significantly more time completing the materials (µ=17.92 minutes) than participants in the Positive News condition (µ=16.01 minutes) (t=1.69; p<0.05), consistent with negative news disclosure decisions triggering more attributional processing than positive news disclosure decisions. I also find evidence that positive and negative news disclosures result different types of attributions. Specifically, participants who were warned about negative news were more likely to attribute the disclosure to management's honesty (Mann-Whitney, p<0.05) and less likely to attribute to management's personal interests (Mann-Whitney, p<0.05) than participants who were warned about positive news. Overall, the attribution results provide strong support for my theoretical predictions about the short-term effects of disclosure decisions. 13 Additional analyses confirm this finding. Participants were asked whether they would feel more negatively overall about the management of a firm that 1) reported actual earnings below the consensus forecast and warned about those unexpected earnings or 2) reported actual earnings above the consensus forecast and did not warn about those unexpected earnings. The majority of participants (63%) stated that they would feel more negatively about management that reported negative news but warned about that news, providing further evidence that news valence is a stronger determinant of overall affect than disclosure decisions. 14 An alternative explanation for this result is that investors are more willing to rely on a subsequent positive news disclosure for a company that previously reported positive news. In other words, the greater inherent plausibility of the subsequent disclosure for Positive News participants, rather than Positive News participants' beliefs about management credibility, could produce the main effect of News Valence on reliance. To rule out this explanation, I conduct an ANCOVA using perceptions of management's competence and trustworthiness as covariates. The effects of News Valence on subsequent reliance are eliminated (F=0.00, p=0.97) in this analysis, suggesting that the effects of News Valence on subsequent reliance are caused by participants' perceptions of management's credibility.
FIGURE 1 OVERVIEW OF THE CREDIBILITY CONSEQUENCES OF DISCLOSURE DECISIONS
This figure provides an overview of my theoretical framework, which indicates that investors experience both cognitive and affective reactions subsequent to a disclosure decision. I predict that cognitive reactions are the primary determinant of management credibility in the short-term. In the longer-term, however, management credibility is determined by investors' affective reactions. This figure depicts the short-and longer-term credibility effects of disclosure decisions. To measure short-term credibility, participants assessed management's competence and trustworthiness immediately after viewing the experimental manipulations. To measure longer-term credibility, participants answered the competence and trustworthiness questions approximately two weeks after viewing the manipulations. See Table 1 b Management competence was measured as the mean of participants' responses to three questions regarding the competence, knowledge, and qualifications of management for providing financial disclosures. Management trustworthiness was measured as the mean of participants' responses to three questions regarding management's trustworthiness, honesty, and truthfulness. All credibility questions were answered on 7-point scales, and responses were standardized so that higher ratings always indicated greater perceived competence/trustworthiness.
News
c Participants' pre-test ratings of management competence and management trustworthiness were included as covariates in the management competence ANCOVA and the management trustworthiness ANCOVA, respectively. Table 1 for a description of the experimental manipulations. Approximately two weeks after viewing these manipulations, participants provided assessments of management's competence and trustworthiness.
b Participants' pre-test ratings of management competence and management trustworthiness were included as covariates in the management competence ANCOVA and the management trustworthiness ANCOVA, respectively.
